The following response papers
were among the best in the first batch of position papers. They are offered
here as a models for writing response papers in this class.
These papers are by no means perfect, but in their own different ways,
each cleverly meets the criteria outlined in the syllabus: the analysis
(not summary) is thoughtful and original; many of the papers synthesize
insights from a variety of different texts; and the writing quality is
superior. Each paper has a different author.
If you have any further questions about why I find these papers exceptional,
please do not hesitate to ask.
At first comparison of the Wiener
and Matthew readings, one might suspect a seeming contradiction. Wiener
presents the view that economic failure hit England due to a social way
of thinking that despised the idea of working to earn a living. Matthew
proves a rising social confidence in economic progress after the Great
Exhibition. Only after examining the “texts” of the times does this seeming
contradiction become clear.
Freeman presents toys of the time
centered around trains. To Wiener this would appear the last remaining
sentiments of support for the industrialization which would come to an
end in 1850 (27). To Matthew this would show the gradual acceptance of
it building up to 1850 and beyond (43). However, in 1840, the first railroad
alphabet emerges with an emphasis on the “scientific wonder” (196) and
industry of it. Another one published in 1865 shows a dramatic turn though,
in focusing on individual tasks. 1870 brought a new focus of haste. Matthew
tells us by the 1870s “the British were becoming a kindlier people (55)
and were partaking in more (thoroughly orchestrated) leisure.
There is a gradual shift present
from the train as a symbol of industry to a sign of something to save time
for leisure’s sake. Even toy trains in the 1870s still looked like the
ancient ones from the 1830s and were not realistically represented (Freeman
200). In 1860, pictures portray trains taking all goods except coal to
London – the staple traffic of the railroad (198). This is a true statement
to the fact that by this time, people did disdain the industrialization,
but that modernization was fine as long as it stayed picturesque.
Therefore, though Wiener and Matthew
seem to be arguing different sides, Freeman presents empirical data to
form a synthesis of all three. Both ideas would lead to an economic failure:
a lack of progression because industry was crude, and a contentment with
the leisure they had found. Like the fixed tracks of the railroad which
were such a new idea, the Victorians perhaps had a subconscious belief
that like the train that led them to their leisure in the country-they
too were on never ending tracks to societal happiness so long as no new
industrial advancements followed.
In my own opinion one of the most
interesting and illuminating vignettes from the Matthew reading is the
discussion found on page 61 regarding the gender ideology which informed
the supposedly ‘laissez-faire’ free-market economy in Britain. The fact
that men were protected financially and legally from the “irrationality”
of their wives’ spending habits reveals not only an economic issue but
also an entire cultural assumption about the nature of femininity and masculinity
in the Victorian period (Matthew 61). Sexual politics also creep into this
example as the very language used to describe women’s irrationality is
in itself sexual, i.e. women can be “seduced” by the wiles of the salesmen
(Matthew 61). Matthew also suggests that consumption itself was a female
domain that needed to be “protected from the full force of the free market”
once again using language which further inscribes sexual difference in
that the female must be protected from the forceful, masculine market.
Though Matthew at first appears to be engaging in a discussion about the
nature of a free market economy, his example prompts the reader to examine
definitions of masculine and feminine identity, providing a glimpse into
the cultural historian’s interest in meaning and identity.
At the same time, I think Matthew’s
range of discussion on gender issues, (though he never specifically labels
any of his sections as pertaining to gender), lets the reader know that
definitions of gender are not static, and that one cannot come to any safe
conclusions about the nature of gender in Victorian Britain. He includes
discussion of the rise of prostitution in the cities and Gladstone’s plan
to rescue ‘fallen women’ which seems to point towards traditional interpretation
of gender roles (Matthew 67). While at the same time mentioning a fall
in the birth rate which could imply that women may have been taking greater
control over reproduction, or could suggest a shift in male sexual identity
(Matthew 69). The chapter also indicated that the supposed ‘separation’
between public and private life could be interpreted differently. Matthew’s
discussion enabled me to examine it both hierarchically, in terms of which
was more culturally important, and also separately, recognizing the power
women did gain within the private sphere. Matthew also mentions the important
role women had in creating social reputation, which provides an insightful
analysis that points towards the idea that public and private life are
not as separate as they may seem (Matthew 75).
Throughout this reading I found
that Matthew often asked questions that at first seemed simply economically
or politically important, but which ultimately pointed toward broader cultural
questions about gender and identity. From this example I think I have gained
a stronger understanding of how to find the right questions to ask as a
cultural historian.
For a country whose success hinged
upon industrialism, capitalistic ventures and a prospering economy, Victorian
Britain seems to be incredibly ambivalent about money. It seems strange
to think that such an overtly prosperous country would perceive money and
the pursuit for material wealth as negative. Perhaps the answer to this
question revolves around the shift in power between the landed aristocracy
and the blossoming new business class.
Much of the aristocracy’s privilege
seems to stem from the luxury of not having to work. Wiener quotes H.J.
Habbakuk: “The main point about landowners – in England at least – is that
they did not acquire their land in order to develop it, but in order to
enjoy it” (13). Although this land gives the aristocracy power over those
who don’t have land, it also gives them the power and privilege of enjoying
leisure, as opposed to working. As the aristocracy had money, they were
also the symbol of civilized British culture. Thus, leisure and the separation
from the ‘lower’ concerns of money became synonymous with culture.
If the aristocracy didn’t have
a connection with work and money, then in comparison, the other classes
must have such a relationship. During the Victorian times, this other class
was most likely involved in industry, which “meant an uncomfortable closeness
to working with one’s hands, not to mention an all-too-direct earning of
money” (18). Problematically, however, control of money was shifting
from the aristocracy to industrialists and capitalists.
Wiener suggests that this shift
is assuaged by the imposition of aristocratic values upon the rising industrial
classes. This does seem to provide a compromise between the two worlds,
by creating gentleman out of a class that has no connections with the aristocracy
in order to preserve British tradition and continuity. Yet, how can an
industrial empire be sustained by education that fosters not industrialists,
but gentleman who scorn money and work? While Wiener offers a convincing
argument of how aristocratic values were sustained through education, it
would be interesting to see how Britain was able to sustain industrialism
with such a system of education.
Throughout Wiener’s “The English
Way of Life,” he repeatedly describes how a sense of nostalgia in the Victorian
Britons allowed for an idealized view of country life. However, while he
goes into great detail about how the country was viewed at this time, he
does not talk very much about what actually was going on in the English
countryside at this time. I think that this lack of explanation hurts his
argument by allowing for confusion between what was really occurring and
what the people idealized.
At different points in his essay,
Wiener talks about how different groups idealized the English countryside.
He talks about writers, aristocrats, and city-dwellers, but fails to mention
the common farm laborer. Since he fails to mention the people who are actually
those involved, it leaves the question open to whether or not there was
any opposition to this standard ideal.
At most times in history, opposition
to what is considered ideal exists. However, Wiener never talks about any
other ideals besides that of the romanticism of the country. What ideals
did the people in the countryside feel? Did they believe that country life
was still good in Britain? Or that it had degenerated? Did these people
just not have a published interpretation of their ideas? Or were these
the people who continued to move into the cities during this time period?
Also, Wiener never mentioned what the exact conditions of the countryside
were. Did even vacationers to the country feel that what they found there
was what they had imagined? By leaving these questions completely unanswered,
I would argue that Wiener’s argument is less substantial than is might
possibly be.
Although the Scottish (and British,
for that matter) people have historically expressed a consistent concern
with nationalism and/or home rule, I don’t find it especially surprising
that these political sentiments should have experienced a pronounced reinvestment
of energy and focus during the mid- to late-Victorian era – and not only
for the reasons examined in our reader. If the Victorian people, with their
increasing suspicion of industrial growth and urbanization of Britain,
looked to the past with a sense of reverie and recreation of values, this
attitude would not only have fostered a nostalgia for a progressively romantic
sense of home and hearth in Scotland, but (with the economic mindset it
subsequently encouraged) it would have also altered the direction in which
surplus economic resources/energies were generally (obviously, on a very
macro level) invested.
The economic progress that characterized
first Imperialism and then, shortly after and in concert with, the Industrial
Revolution in Britain, often exhibits a homogenizing or melding effect
on the loosely disparate national/economic entities involved (hence our
concern with NAFTA, and the European concern with the Euro) – especially
when these entities operate with the same currency – but this effect does
not simple follow, but is itself a cause and necessary preclusion to sustained
national growth. Expenditure that, previously, may have been directed toward
unproductive ends (like the arts, religion and poetry) that, in many cases,
contribute to a sense of cultural identity, is (in the dynamic of growth)
necessarily re-invested into the means by which that growth is created.
The best historical example that I can think of is the birth of the Islamic
nation. Prior to the prophet Mohammed, the disparate Arab clans dissipated
a large portion of their excess resources in warring with another over
long-standing blood and clan feuds (also in rival forms of poetry and sexuality)
and, despite, the weakening of the neighbouring Persian and Byzantine empires,
were never able to organize effective or sustained expansion. The introduction
of Islamic faith, highly critical of unproductive expenditures (specifically
those mentioned above), created a moral environment in which that excess
energy was to be directed outside of their community – and, hence, through
the inter-related dynamic of expenditure and the consolidation of community
and formidable, progress oriented empire was formed. And yet, when the
empire reached the feasible limits of growth, the excess could no longer
be directed outwards but was once again (slowly) to operate within the
community and re-introduced different kinds of cultural or social disparity.
The circumstance of British Imperialism
and industrial progress were, obviously, of a much different kind and occurred
in almost an entirely different context. However, I would still suggest
the general dynamic of growth would have de-emphasized national differences
in Victorian Britain in ways similar to the consolidation of Arab clans,
and when that progress (for whatever reason) was abated, it would have
then allowed for more attention and energy to be